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RAPE, AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT TO SEX, AND SEXUAL
AUTONOMY: INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM
Jane Campbell Moriarty ∗
The time is now propitious, as he guesses,
The meal is ended, she is bored and tired,
Endeavours to engage her in caresses
Which are still unreproved, if undesired.
Flushed and decided, he assaults at once;
Exploring hands encounter no defence;
His vanity requires no response,
And makes a welcome of indifference. 1

We may have moved in the West toward a standard in which “no
means no” has the force of criminal law behind it. But are we ready for
a standard in which only “yes means yes?” And if so, getting to yes may
be a winding path to follow. The concept of consent, some of the
symposium authors note, is a far more complicated inquiry than many
appreciate. Consider the Eliot quotation above: is it consensual if his
exploring hands encounter no defense? Is indifference sufficient to
establish consent and if not, should his act be considered criminal rather
than just boorish? This is only one, among many, questions with which
the symposium authors grapple.
This symposium, composed of international scholars, originated
from two presentations at the Law and Society Conference in Berlin,
Germany in July, 2007. Each group focused its presentations on the
thorny issues arising from determining when sex is the product of free
choice, when it is the result of force, and the legal and philosophical
implications arising from those issues. Subsequently, the Akron Law
Review decided that the subjects of the Berlin Conference would make

∗

Professor, University of Akron School of Law.
1. T.S. Eliot, The Waste Land, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS, 1909-1950 (Harcourt,
Brace & World 1952).
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an interesting and topical Symposium. They invited the authors from the
conference, along with a few other professors, to write for this edition.
To introduce this Symposium, I first discuss the issues related to
the crime of rape, the idea of sexual autonomy, and the concept of
affirmative consent to sex. Then, I briefly summarize the symposium
authors’ various approaches to these topics.
To echo Donald Dripps’ sentiment, rape is an exceptional crime,
one treated differently than other serious crimes. 2 There are many
reasons for this exceptionalism. The historical burdens on rape victims
to prove a rape occurred were unusual, draconian, and substantial. 3 It is
only in the last several decades that the law has changed to bring rape
into line with burdens approximating other crimes. 4 The exceptionalism
may also arise from the complicated nature of sex: when engaged in
voluntarily, sex may be a delightful, perhaps even transcendent
experience. 5 In stark contraposition, sex against one’s will is a horrific
experience—a most brutal crime of violence. 6 Indeed, rape in war has
been termed a form of torture. 7 Rape is not unbidden physical affection;
it is the violent use of person against her will with no regard for her
personal desires. 8
Further complicating the crime of rape is the development of two
distinct categories of rape: what some ironically call “real rape,” where

2. See Donald Dripps, After Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the Prosecution
of Sexual Assault?, 41 AKRON L. REV. 957 (2008). See also Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L. J.
1087, 1095 (1986)(discussing how the definition of nonconsent is unique in law).
3. See Dripps, supra note 2, at 960-66 (citing MATTHEW HALE, 1 HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 628, 628-35 (1646)).
4. Id. For a detailed discussion of some of the rape reforms, see Meredith J. Duncan, Sex
Crimes and Sexual Miscues: The Need for a Clearer Line Between Forcible Rape and NonConsensual Sex, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1087, 1095-1108 (2007).
5. See, e.g., JOHN DONNE, The Ecstasy, in JOHN DONNE: THE MAJOR WORKS 121, 121-23
(1990).
6. Estrich, supra note 2, at 1087. (“Eleven years ago, a man held an ice pick to my throat
and said ‘Push over, shut up, or I’ll kill you.’ . . . A hundred years later, I jumped out of my car as
he drove away.”). See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE, 34774 (1975) (recounting rape narratives from victims).
7. See Hannah Pearce, An Examination of the International Understanding of Political Rape
and the Significance of Labeling it Torture, 14 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 534, 540-41 (2002) (discussing
how the United Nations Convention Against Torture recognized rape as a form of torture during
prosecutions involving the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda). For further discussion about rape
during wartime, see BROWNMILLER, supra note 6, at 31-113.
8. See generally Pearce, supra note 7. “It is not passion or lust gone wrong. It is first and
foremost an act of aggression with a sexual manifestation.” Pearce, supra note 7, at 534 (quoting
Catherine Niarchos, Women, War, and Rape: Challenges Facing the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 649, 650 n.4 (1995)).
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the victim is attacked by a stranger, 9 and acquaintance rape, where the
victim knows the attacker. 10 While many scholars and rape researchers
recognize that acquaintance rape is by far more common than stranger
rape, 11 and often equally horrific for the victim, 12 prosecutors often
decline to bring such cases for fear they cannot be won. 13
For somewhat apparent reasons, proving the crime when it occurs
between acquaintances is particularly fraught with difficulty since the
defense raised is generally one of consent. Whom to believe? The legal,
moral, philosophical, and practical implications of determining whether
sex was voluntary or criminal are daunting.
The competing
considerations between fairness to both accused and victimized are
substantial and difficult to resolve. What happens when the parties were
drinking? Was consent legally possible? Was consent, or lack thereof,
properly understood? Does anyone have an accurate recall of the events
that occurred at the time in question? And additionally, the old standard
rape myths—she shouldn’t have gone home with him, women lie about
rape, women are irresponsible temptresses, she must have wanted it if
she was drinking with him 14 —affect prosecutorial decisions to bring
cases and influence juror’s decisions about such cases. All of these
concerns and more are discussed in the symposium articles.
Among the first problems is the question of defining rape. Should

9. Estrich, supra note 2, at 1088 (explaining how the police considered the attack that she
suffered while exiting her car one night a “real rape”). See also SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 11
(1987); Michelle J. Anderson, All-American Rape, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 625, 625-28 (2005)
(discussing the two standards).
10. See Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Rape
Victimization: Findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey, NAT’L INST. OF JUST.
SPECIAL REPORT (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, D.C.), Jan. 2006, at 21 available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/210346.pdf (distinguishing between stranger and acquaintance
rape). The latter includes relatives, spouses, and acquaintances. Id.
11. See Tjaden & Thoennes, supra note 10 (noting that the vast majority of women who are
raped by force or threat of force (83.3%) are victimized by someone they know—including
relatives, spouses, and acquaintances). This survey only includes rapes accomplished with force or
threat of force. Id.
12. See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1415-17
(2005) (discussing the psychological harm that acquaintance rape can cause).
13. See Dripps, supra note 2, at Section III (Why the Return to Consent Won’t Normalize
Rape Law). See Aviva Ornstein, Special Issues Raised by Rape Trials, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585,
1590 (2007) (discussing how prosecutors winnow out weak cases from the system); Lisa Frohmann,
Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, Class, and Gender Ideologies in
Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 L. & SOC’Y REV. 531, 531 (1997) (discussing ethnographic data
from prosecutors on convictability in sexual assault cases).
14. See Dripps, supra note 2, at 972 (discussing the myth of “justified rape”). For a fuller
discussion of the classic rape myths, see Morrison Torrey, When Will We be Believed? Rape Myths
and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1013, 1025-31 (1991).
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the definition of rape require proof of force/threat of force, or should it
only require proof that the sex was against one’s consent? As the
symposium authors discuss, the United States, Canada, and the United
Kingdom each vary in their approaches. The Sexual Offences Act 2003,
enacted in England and Wales, defines rape as non-consensual sex in
which the defendant does not reasonably believe in consent. 15
Currently, United States rape statistics include only forcible rapes, 16
although some U.S. jurisdictions have changed the standard to eliminate
the force requirement and to define rape as unconsented-to-sex. 17
Canada has gone further than most U.S. jurisdictions, moving toward a
requirement that “only yes means yes.” 18 The somewhat western
movement toward a consent standard has generated a great deal of
scholarship—and the authors in this symposium have various
approaches to the issue, as detailed herein.
Another issue the writers in this Symposium tackle is whether, in
consent-only jurisdictions, the consent must be verbal or may be
assumed from silence or from actions. Should the law impose upon
women the obligation to speak up and say “no”, or should the law
impose upon men the obligation to first hear the word “yes”? Requiring
a man to obtain verbal consent, some scholars muse, comes close to
criminalizing normal sexual behavior. 19 Many other scholars in this
symposium agree with requiring affirmative consent.
The emergence of the so-called “hooking up culture”—where
young adults (often college students) meet at bars or parties, drink to
excess, and then go off to have a single night of sex together—has
created a whole new set of complicated problems for the law, social
science researchers, and legal theorists. 20 Has the culture changed so

15. See Vanessa E. Munro, Constructing Consent: Legislating Freedom and Legitimating
Constraint in the Expression of Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 923, 935-947 (2008)
(discussing the Sexual Offences Act 2003).
16. See Tjaden & Thoennes, supra note 10.
17. See Nicholas J. Little, Note, From No Means No to Only Yes Means Yes: The Rational
Results of an Affirmative Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1321, 1341-44 (2005).
18. See Lise Gotell, Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault Law:
Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women, 41 AKRON L. REV. 865, 869 (2008).
19. See Richard Klein, Am Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating
Search for Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REV. 981 (2008); Dan Subotnik, Copulemus in
Pace: A Meditation on Rape, Affirmative Consent to Sex, and Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV.
847 (2008).
20. See, e.g., William Flack, Jr. et al, Risk Factors and Consequences of Unwanted Sex
Among University Students: Hooking Up, Alcohol, and Stress Response, 22 J. OF INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE, 139, 139-41 n.2 (2007) (describing the concept of “hooking up”); Subotnik, supra note
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substantially that current legal concepts of consent do not fit with the
culture’s behavior? Moreover, while it turns out that both young men
and women are engaging in this type of sexual behavior with some
degree of willingness, stereotypes of men-as-studs and women-as-sluts
continue to inform the collective consciousness of these young people. 21
The writers of this symposium address the effects of persistent
stereotypes and lay-person conceptions on legal decisions. 22
Another stereotype that informs the law suggests that men are
entitled, consistent with “tradition,” to continue pursuing sex unless and
until a woman says no or physically resists. This conception of woman
as gatekeeper of virtue imagines a being who is passive up till the
minute she resists. Is this a realistic view of how women behave? And,
indeed, in asking these questions, have we conflated voluntary sexual
activity with the violent crime of rape?
Yet, some scholars accurately note that even with the affirmative
consent standard, both judicial and societal standards seem to demand
the “ideal” victim—one who is responsible, security conscious, and
careful to minimize her own risk. 23 The theme of women as
irresponsible and in part to blame for their own rapes seems to arise
anytime women drink, are overly flirtatious, or accompany men without
chaperones. 24 Yet, is it reasonable, or indeed fair, for the law to expect
women to engage in risk avoidance so that they do not become crime
victims? Does this again turn the law on its head and provide another
way of reformulating women as “gatekeepers of their virtue”? Or
perhaps it merely recognizes the reality of adults assuming partial
responsibility for their own decision-making.
Are women temptresses?
Passive or assertive in setting
boundaries? Sexual recipients rather than sexual aggressors? Chaste or
slutty? In need of protection or considered as equal participants? Do
women want sex or simply put up with it? The duality assumed in these
questions often defines the contours and boundaries of rape law. Law
and society’s consideration of women-as-sexualized-beings often

19, at 852-53 (discussing KATHLEEN A. BOGLE, HOOKING UP, SEX, DATING AND RELATIONSHIPS
ON CAMPUS (N.Y.U. Press 2008)).
21. See Dripps, supra note 2, at 970.
22. Compare Gotell, supra note 18, and Sharon Cowan, The Trouble with Drink:
Intoxication, (In)capacity, and the Evaporation of Consent to Sex, 41 AKRON L. REV. 899 (2008)
with Dripps, supra note 2.
23. See, e.g., Gotell, supra note 18, at 878-79.
24. Gotell, supra note 18, at 879. See Dripps, supra note 2, at 972-73; Cowan, supra note 22,
at 906.
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demand a virtuous, nearly flawless victim for the crime of rape to be
taken seriously.
Dan Subotnik’s article provides a critique of the affirmative consent
doctrine, questioning whether it is a necessary or desirable change to the
law of rape, particularly at a time when women seem to enjoy more
sexual power than at any other time in history. Professor Subotnik’s
provocative argument considers the writing of sexually autonomous
women, posing an alternative view of feminist sex, where women are
powerful and in control of their sexuality. Subotnik’s research reveals
that a random sampling of female students do not fear rape to the degree
that many feminist scholars believe; an interesting and possibly
counterintuitive concept. Nonetheless, data suggest that the lack of fear
may be misguided: according to extrapolations from the National
Violence Against Women Survey conducted by the United States
Department of Justice, one in six women will be forcibly raped. 25
By contrast, Lise Gotell’s article, delving into the Canadian law,
explains how the affirmative and specific consent standard works and
yet how the most vulnerable of women—the aboriginal, the homeless
and the addicted—are still victimized both by rape and the interpretation
of law. Far from viewing women as sexually autonomous and powerful,
Professor Gotell provides a view of how women are now obligated to
avoid “risky behavior,” and to prevent the rape from occurring.
“[C]onsistency, rationality, and risk-avoidance” she writes “constitute
new markers of normative conduct against which the behaviors and
credibility of actual complainants are measured and assessed.” 26
Dr. Sharon Cowan’s article concerns the problem of intoxicated
consent, focusing on United Kingdom cases, statutes, and policy. Dr.
Cowan first examines the nature of consent, explaining the problems that
flow from defining consent as either a function of mind (mens rea) or a
function of physicality (acting or speaking as to convey permission).
She suggests that the more accurate approach is not to separate mind
from body but to consider both together. Nonetheless, the intoxicated
victim poses a particular challenge in terms of defining consent. Dr.
Cowan proposes more guidance for judges and juries on both the nature
of intoxication and the problems of determining capacity to consent.
Vanessa Munro explains the philosophic and legal construction of
the concept of consent. She argues that contemporary interpretations
often fail to appreciate that women’s consent, like that of workers in

25. Tjaden & Thoennes, supra note 10, at 7.
26. Gotell, supra note 18, at 881.
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exploitive employment practices, may arise from necessity rather than
free will. She describes the development of the Sexual Offences Act
2003, used in England and Wales, and considers both the merits and
shortcomings of the Act in light of her underlying philosophical
analysis. Professor Munro concludes that while the Act has much merit,
additional legislative intervention, further judicial instructions, and
education for juries on rape myths would result in more just conclusions.
Donald Dripps’ article expresses concern that while the “elite,”—
the legal and academic communities—continue to rework and refine
rape law to make it easier to prosecute difficult, but potentially valid
cases, juries refuse to convict in many of these same cases. Tracing the
development of consent-only statutes in the law, he concludes that such
a change will not normalize the law of rape because juries will still
continue to be strongly influenced by firmly-held stereotypes that
women who drink or who engage in flirtatious behavior are not
blameless victims. Citing research, he states that “[p]opular opinion,
confronted with a sexually active man and a sexually active woman, sees
not two morally equivalent hedonists, but a stud and a slut.” 27 The
solution Professor Dripps devises is to create new statutes for sexwithout-consent, which would provide misdemeanor-only jail time. This
approach would allow these cases to be tried without juries. He
recognizes that this solution poses numerous concerns but emphasizes
that it provides some very concrete benefits.
Richard Klein considers affirmative consent in the context of the
dramatic evidentiary changes in rape law, explaining the history of the
legal development of the law in great detail. He concludes that when the
changes to the law of rape are considered in their totality, the move
toward affirmative consent is both unnecessary and unfair to defendants.
Specifically, Professor Klein discusses the reduction in proof required to
establish rape and the creation of a rape shield defense. Particularly
pernicious, he argues, is the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 413,
which permits the prosecution to introduce not only prior convictions for
rape but also an unprosecuted complaint for prior sexual assaults. In
addition, Professor Klein expresses concern that many rape cases have
included somewhat questionable social science in the form of rape
trauma syndrome evidence. This evidence is often introduced only to
provide an explanation for behaviors alleged to be associated with rape,
yet its very generality invites the jury to infer that this person was

27. Dripps, supra note 2, at 971.
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raped—even though the expert never so testified. It is thus quite
prejudicial but nearly impossible to effectively counter.
Kerri Lynn Stone’s article focuses on the recidivist offender in the
context of sexual harassment, explaining the contours of employer
liability in those cases and providing a new framework for imposing
liability. Professor Stone argues that pursuant to current United States
Supreme Court law, employers can escape liability for serial sexual
harassers by moving the harasser to a different part of the company,
where he is free to harass, but the newly-harassed employee cannot sue
successfully. To correct this problem, she urges courts to analyze these
cases with an eye toward whether a harasser is a repeat offender—rather
than focusing on whether the woman is a first-time victim.
The symposium participants offer thoughtful, interesting, and,
indeed, challenging suggestions for resolving the many questions and
concerns that the topics of rape, affirmative consent to sex, and sexual
autonomy pose.
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